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Abstract—With the rapid development of MANET, secure
and practical authentication is becoming increasingly important.
The existing works perform the research from two aspects,
i.e., (a)secure key division and distributed storage, (b)secure
distributed authentication. But there still exist several unsolved
problems. Specifically, it may suffer from cheating problems and
fault authentication attack, which can result in authentication
failure and DoS attack towards authentication service. Besides,
most existing schemes are not with satisfactory efficiency due to
exponential arithmetic based on Shamir’s scheme. In this paper,
we explore the property of verifiable secret sharing(VSS) schemes
with Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), then propose a secret
key distributed storage scheme based on CRT-VSS and trusted
computing for MANET. Specifically, we utilize trusted computing
technology to solve two existing cheating problems in secret shar-
ing area before. After that, we do the analysis of homomorphism
property with CRT-VSS and design the corresponding shares-
product sharing scheme with better concision. On such basis,
a secure distributed Elliptic Curve-Digital Signature Standard
signature (ECC-DSS) authentication scheme based on CRT-VSS
scheme and trusted computing is proposed. Furthermore, as an
important property of authentication scheme, we discuss the
refreshing property of CRT-VSS and do thorough comparisons
with Shamir’s scheme. Finally, we provide formal guarantees
towards our schemes proposed in this paper.
Keywords-secret sharing, trusted computing, Chinese Remain-
der Theorem, distributed authentication, CSP security model
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc network(MANET) is a new kind of wireless
mobile network, where nodes are dispersed and easy to be
compromised. So it isn’t reasonable to assume such a trust
center in MANET. This makes the central management of
secret keys and traditional authentication scheme with single
CA weak and dangerous. In order to solve such problem
and build dependable schemes, most of the existing work
contributes to the design of secure distributed authentication
scheme in such two steps as follows,
• divide the secret key in some way (e.g., secret sharing
scheme) and distribute them to different nodes.
• design the detailed secure and dependable authentication
process, whose essence is the reconstruction of original
secret key and generation of authentication signature.
Specifically, in the first step, the private key of CA will
be divided in shares by threshold cryptography scheme,e.g.
(t, n) threshold Shamir’s scheme[21]. Then the shares will be
stored into n different nodes and each node has one. As for
the second step, distributed authentication, many schemes are
proposed to provide the service of a distributed CA. And there
have been several corresponding schemes, e.g. the multi-hop
authentication scheme with RSA function in [22], ElGamal
shape function scheme in [15] and threshold DSS (Digital
Signature Standard) scheme in [8].
However, there still exist several problems. The threshold
secret sharing schemes all have two categories of cheating
problems against secret distributor and participants respec-
tively. And existing authentication solutions can’t eliminate
the possibility of cheating (just detect it with some compu-
tation overhead). Most of existing distributed authentication
schemes, e.g., [8],[22], lack the validation of the secret shares
and trusted property of the nodes, which will result in fault
attack problem [17]. Furthermore, the misbehavior of authen-
tication nodes may lead to DoS towards the authentication
service. What’s worse, most of existing works based on
Shamir’s scheme[21] suffer from a relative high complexity
of exponent arithmetic in secret reconstruction phase.
Due to the reasons above, we aim to contribute as below:
• First, we propose a new scheme based on CRT-VSS
(Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme Based on Chinese
Remainder Theorem) scheme instead of Shamir’s scheme,
tackling security problems with better efficiency. Specifi-
cally, we utilize the trusted computing technology to solve
two cheating problems above.
• Then we explore (⊕,⊕), (⊗,⊗) homomorphism property
for CRT-VSS scheme and design the secure shares-
product sharing scheme with CRT scheme. It owns better
concision and equal security property compared with
Shamir’s scheme.
• On such basis, a trusted ECC-DSS distributed authenti-
cation scheme is proposed to eliminate the possibility of
the DoS and fault attack problems before. Furthermore,
we discuss the refreshing property of CRT-VSS scheme
and do thorough comparisons with Shamir’s scheme as
an important property of authentication scheme towards
mobile adversaries [24] tolerance
• Finally, we model our schemes and ensure the security
with formal guarantees.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce related works in this paper. In Section III, we de-
sign and analyze the framework of authentication between two
nodes(as initiator and responder) and prepare it as a module
which will be used in detailed scheme below. Section IV shows
the secret key distributed storage scheme based on CRT-VSS
and trusted computing. In section V we explore and do some
analysis for the homomorphism property of the CRT-VSS
scheme. Then we propose our trusted ECC-DSS distributed
authentication scheme in section VI. In Section VIII, we
present security analysis on the schemes in this paper. Finally,
Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. threshold secret sharing scheme
In traditional (t, n) threshold secret sharing schemes, the
secret distributor D divides the secret S into n shares and
deliver them to n participants securely. The recovery of secret
S can only be accomplished by a coalition not less than
t participants. The most popular secret sharing scheme is
Shamir’s scheme in [21]. The reconstruction of secret can be
realized with complexity O(tlog2t) [21]. The first secret shar-
ing scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT)
is proposed in [1] with reconstruction complexity O(t). There
exist two kinds of cheating problems in secret sharing area. (1)
cheating from distributor. Distributor delivers the false secret
shares to corresponding authentication nodes, braking the base
of authentication. (2) cheating among participants. During
the reconstruction phase, malicious participant will provide
false/fault shares, leading to unfair, inconsistent results, etc.
The verifiable secret scheme development based on zero-
knowledge proof evidence has both improvements on the
original Shamir’s and CRT scheme(e.g. [13],[18]), which can
only be used to detect such cheating problems but without
elimination. The detection scheme in [9] can achieve the goal
in some specified condition, but inefficient and restricted to
specified cheater number condition. Though work in [14] uses
the range proof techniques to prove the right range of the
generated parameters, it can’t provide further assurance or
evidence about the right property of the node.
B. homomorphism property and distributed authentication
In order to tolerate mobile adversaries, the key management
service proposed in [24] employs share refreshing as an
important scheme which relying on the (⊕,⊕) homomorphism
property. It is indicated in [4] that the traditional Shamir’s
threshold scheme only has the (⊕,⊕)-homomorphism prop-
erty, without the (⊗,⊗) or (⊕,⊗)- property. While it’s
only mentioned in [4],[13] that the extended Asmuth-Bloom
scheme has homomorphism proprieties but without any proof
about it. The discussion about homomorphism property of
CRT-VSS scheme is rare.
In the Distributed CA scheme in [24], the private key of CA
is divided into several shares and distributed to several chosen
entities, and each has one and only one part. Distributed
authentication is the result of the Distributed CA scheme in
the distributed environment of MANET. The scheme proposed
in [22] realize the authentication with the process of the multi-
hop signing. The encrypted functions mechanism[19] is used
to strengthen the privacy and security of the authentication
process, similar related work can be seen in [7]. In [8], a
meaningful robust DSS signature schemes are proposed under
different security requirements. But in all the schemes pro-
posed above, the choice of nodes coalition for authentication
is random and lacks validation, including the secret shares
and the trusted property of the nodes. This may lead to
DoS and fault attack problem [17] . Besides, RSA/Elgamal
encrypt/decrypt and signature mechanism utilized by all the
schemes above has a relative limited efficiency in MANET
according to analysis in [7].
C. trusted computing
Trusted Computing(TC) is a new technology developed
and promoted by the Trusted Computing Group(TCG) for
enhancing the security of computers and networks. The root of
trust is a tamper resistant hardware engine, called TPM. TPM
is assumed robust against both hardware and software attacks
from either the underlying host or external sources. The aim of
TC is to allow someone else to verify that only authorized code
runs on a system. There are at least 16 PCRs in a TPM and a
PCR is a 160-bit shielded storage location to hold an unlimited
number of measurements in the way like this: PCRnew=SHA-
1(PCRold || measurement). A simple way to accomplish
the measurement mentioned here is to do a digest of the
configuration of the platform to ensure the integrity of a
Platform. Direct anonymous attestation (DAA) protocol [5]
was adopted by TCG as the method for remote authentication
of the hardware module TPM, while preserving the privacy of
the user of the platform that contains the module. Furthermore,
the Property-Based Attestation(PBA) scheme proposed in [6]
present a new privacy-preserving approach to attest the right
configuration of host. Now the application of TC technology
appears in various areas, e.g., inference Control [23], Ad hoc
routing protocol security [12], digital rights management, etc.
III. FRAMEWORK OF AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL BASED
ON TRUSTED COMPUTING BETWEEN TWO NODES
In the two important steps of a secure authentication
scheme, i.e. secure secret division/distribution and secure
distributed authentication, the right behavior of the nodes
is so important that it should be ensured in some reliable
authentication way. Otherwise the malicious action of nodes
may lead to cheating problems and DoS/fault attack. In order
to solve this problem, we will utilize the trusted computing
technology, including the property of TPM, the secure and
authentication property of trusted computing protocols, e.g.
DAA[5] and PBA[6] protocol. Because the authentication
between two nodes will be referred and used repeatedly in
the detailed schemes below, here we will first illustrate the
framework of the authentication protocol between two nodes,
one initiator and responder, in the MANET. Then the other
part of this paper can refer it as a module easily. Without
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loss of generality, suppose the authentication process happens
between node Pi and Pj , node Pi request for authentication
from node Pj . The authentication process between them is as
follows in Figure 1.
1. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,INIT
2. Pj → Pi: idj ,idi,n1
3. Pi → Pj : idi,idj , im=SHA-1(idi||n1||PCR),
DSi = DAASign(im),PSi = PBASign(im),
SHA-1(idi||K INFO I||im||DSi||PSi),K INFO I
4. Pj → Pi: idj , idi,SskAIKJ (K INFO J||idj),{idj||n2}kij
5. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,{idi||n2}kij
Fig. 1. Pi request for authentication from node Pj
In the framework, each node maintains three lists:
• Neighbor list N . records the IDs of the neighbor nodes.
• Trust list T . records the authentication result of differ-
ent neighbors with different symbols, e.g. 1 represents
trusted, 0 for no authentication before and -1 for authen-
tication failure, initially all 0.
• Key list K . stores the established session with trusted
neighbor nodes, initially empty.
Now we will do some explanation to the details of the
framework proposed above as follows.
1. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,INIT
Node Pi sends the request for authentication towards node
Pj with its ID idi and destination ID idj .
2. Pj → Pi: idj ,idi,n1
After receiving the request from node Pi, Pj first check the
ID idi in neighbor list N , if there is no match then drop the
request without any reply, else node Pj reply with its ID idj
and a random nonce n1 as the challenge.
3. Pi → Pj : idi,idj , im=SHA-1(idi||n1||PCR),
DSi = DAASign(im),PSi = PBASign(im),
SHA-1(idi||K INFO I||im||DSi||PSi),K INFO I
After receiving the n1 from Pj , node Pi will do the
following work.
• Compute the measurement of integrity towards the plat-
form by im=SHA-1(idi||n1||PCR). Here we note that
the measurement of the integrity consists of the content
of PCR. Due to the TPM will record the measurement
of the paltform from time to time by the function and
update of PCRs. Here we use the command TPM Quote
to get the content of the specified PCR. And the PCR can
be updated by the command TPM Extend.
• Generate the DAA signature to attest to Pj its perfect
TPM. Here the the integrity measurement im computed
above will be the parameter,DSi = DAASign(im).
• Generate the PBA signature to furthermore attest to Pj
that its configuration and property is in a good set but
without revealing the details. It is assumed that before
running the PBA protocol, node Pi and Pj have already
agreed on a set of configuration values denoted CS =
{cs1, . . . , csn}.
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The generation denoted as PSi = PBASign(CS, im).
Note that CS is constructed and planted inside the nodes
initially and will be updated consistently if necessary
according to the technology of trust computing.
• If there is no key established with node Pj , K[idj]
is empty, node Pi will generate its public part
parameters according to Diffie-Hellman key exchange
scheme, denoted as K INFO I=(g,p,gx mod p)
and provide the integrity assurance by SHA-
1(idi||K INFO I||im||DSi||PSi), otherwise the digest
assurance is SHA-1(idi||im||DSi||PSi)
4. Pj → Pi: idj , idi,SskAIKJ (K INFO J||idj),{idj||n2}kij
After receiving the signature attest message from Pi, node
Pj will do the following work.
• Check the integrity of the message by digest assurance
above. If check fails, then drop the message and abort.
• Validate the DAA and PBA signature by
DAAV erify(DSI),PBAV erify(CS, im). If any
verification fails, abort the protocol and mark the trusted
symbol by T [idi] = −1, otherwise T [idi] = 1.
• Like above, if there is no key established be-
fore, then generate its public part parameters as
K INFO J=(g,p,gy mod p). Furthermore sign the
K INFO J structure with its ID under the private key
of AIK inside the TPM to attest the right origin, in
order to avoid the possibility of man-in-the-middle attack.
Then the session key between the nodes can be generated
according to DH scheme, denoted as kij = (gx)y mod p.
Then node Pj stores the session key kij in the key
list as K[idi] = kij and generate the encryption part
{idj||n2}kij with its ID idj and random nonce n2 inside.
5. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,{idi||n2}kij
• Pi first validate the signature with the public AIK
of Pj by SpkAIKJ (SskAIKJ (K INFO J||idj))
?
=
K INFO J’||idj . If it fails, abort and without any reply.
• Similarly, if there is no key established before, Pi first
generate the session key kij with the K INFO J and its
own part K INFO I according to DH scheme denoted as
kij = (g
y)x mod p. Then stores the key kij in its key
list.
• Then node Pi decrypt the encrypted message
{{idj||n2}kij}k−1ij
and get the nonce n2.
• At last node Pi generates the encryption part {idi||n2}kij
with its ID idi and nonce n2 above together to inform
neighbor node Pj that the key kij has been well estab-
lished between them.
Some additional explanation about the details of the scheme
above is provided as follows.
1) The Neighbor list is constructed by routing protocols,
e.g., OLSR, AODV. Besides, it and can consist of
1We notice that, the configuration values in CS may vary from node to
node and time to time, to synchronize with updates and to cover all nodes’
configuration is important but not the focus of this paper, we assume such an
agreement by some specific protocol.
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the nodes not neighbored stringently, e.g., the two-
hop neighbors in OLSR, in order to contain enough
neighbors( not less than n).
2) The update and change of Neighbor list N will result
in the update of the trust list T and key list K . Once
neighbor node moves out of the region, the item will be
removed out from the neighbor list and that will lead to
corresponding item abolishment in the trust list and key
list respectively.
3) In order to enhance the security, the trust list T and
key list K should be re-initialized periodically. So the
authentication process should be executed periodically
when necessary.
In the other parts of the paper, we will refer this authentica-
tion process as a module denoted as auth(idi, idj) indicating
node Pi running authentication process with node Pj and
request for the authentication from the later. The security
analysis about the protocol will be left in section VIII.
IV. SECRET KEY DISTRIBUTED STORAGE SCHEME BASED
ON CRT-VSS AND TRUSTED COMPUTING
Our scheme has two phases. One is the distributing phase in
which distributor divides the secret S into n shares(denoted
as {Si}i∈{1,...,n}) and distributes them to a set of n nodes
as participants(denoted as set P). The other is reconstruction
phase, any coalition of t nodes(described as C) can reconstruct
the secret S together. The details can be described as follows.
A. Distribution phase
To share a secret S among a set of n nodes with verifiable
shares, the distributor does the following:
1) Setup work. Distributor D setup and set the related pa-
rameters, including the big prime number m0(m0 > S),
the positive sequence m = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} meets the
requirements below:
• the sequence m = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} is increasing;
• (mi,mj) = 1, (i 6= j);
• (mi,m0) = 1, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n);
• N =
∏t
i=1mi > m
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∏t−1
i=1 mn−i+1;
• ensure the pi = 2mi + 1 is still prime.
After that distributor need to choose a random positive integer
A satisfied the condition 0 < A < M ,and y = S+Am0 < M ,
here the M =
∏t
i=1mi. Then y is the real shape of the secret
S to be divided later.
2) The distributor D choose n trusted neighbors nodes
{Pi}i∈{1,...,n}(denoted as set P) to be qualified participants
to distribute the shares later.
• D B→ {ND}: idD,AUTH,SskAIK (idD). {ND} is the neigh-
bor set of D. The distributor D broadcasts(denoted as B→
notation) a AUTH message to inform its neighbors the
authentication election event. The message consists of the
ID of D, authentication symbol AUTH and the signature
of the idD by the private key of the AIK inside the TPM
of distributor D to attest to Pi ∈ {ND} the identify of D.
• Pi → D: idi,idD,auth(idi, idD).
After receiving the AUTH message, Pi first check
the signature with the public AIK of D by
SpkAIKD (SskAIKD (idi))
?
= idi. If it holds, then
Pi begins to execute the authentication process as
auth(idi, idD), else Pi drop the AUTH message without
any reply.
• After the authentication process, Distributor D choose n
qualified nodes from the trust list T as participants.
3) Reversely, the distributor D executes the authentication
process to attest to the selected participants {Pi}i∈{1,...,n}.
• D → {Pi}(Pi ∈ P): auth(idD, idi).
• Pi → D: idi,idD, AGREE.
If Pi pass the authentication process from D and agree
to undertake the responsibility as a participant, Pi reply
with a AGREE message to inform the distributor D, else
deny and refuse the request without reply.
If D doesn’t receive the AGREE message from Pi, D have
to remove the id of the Pi from the participant set P. This
step won’t finish until the participant set has n participants,
equally receiving n AGREE messages totally.
4) The distributor D generates and distributs shares and
validation information securely.
• D → {Pi}(Pi ∈ P): idD,idi, {Si}kiD .
Let gi ∈ Zpi be an element of order mi. D computes the
shares by Si = y(mod mi) and encrypts Si by the session
key established in the authentication process before. This
will keep the secret of the shares.
• D B→ {Pi}: idD,PUBLIC,SskAIKD (idD||pi||gi||mi).
Then distributor generates the validation information by
zi = g
Si
i (mod pi) and makes the values pi,gi,zi public
by the broadcast PUBLIC message. In order to ensure
the correctness of the origin of the public information,
the signature with private AIK skAIKD is included in
the message.
After receiving the PUBLIC message, the participants can
verify the correctness of the origin of public information by the
signature. With the correct validation information, participant
Pi can find whether his share is valid or not by checking
zi = g
Si
i (mod pi).
The work and schemes proposed before all assume that D
is honest. But once the malicious distributor D distributes the
shares for some y > M , then y will be greater than MC for all
coalition C of size t. Hence, according to the analysis in [14]
, C may not compute the correct y value or recover correct
secret S with inconsistent results. But here in the scheme, with
the authentication help of the trusted computing technology,
the first cheating problem exists in this phase before can be
eliminated.
B. reconstruction phase
As can be seen in the notations Table I, without loss of
generality, suppose C = {Pik}k∈{1,...,t},MC =
∏
i∈C mi,
MC\{ik} =
∏
j∈C,j 6=ik
mj , M
′
C,ik
≡ M−1
C\{ik}
(mod mik),
M
′
C,ik
M−1
C\{ik}
≡ 1(mod mik), the exchange of shares and
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reconstruction happens between the participants in the coali-
tion C. Pik , Pij ∈ C. The details are as follows.
1)Pij should firstly ensure that the other participants, denoted
as Pik(ik 6= ij),in the coalition C are all trusted.
• If T [ik] = 1 and K[ik] not empty, then Pik is trusted and
goto the next step.
• If T [ik] = −1, then the authentication from Pik before
failed, Pij abort and the coalition should be rebuilt.
• If T [ik] = 0, no authentication before. Pij asks for new
auth(idik , idij ) process for the Pik and deal with the
result as before. If the authentication succeeds, goto the
next step.
2) After the insurance towards the participants in coalition C,
Pij delivers its share Sij to other participant securely.
Pij → Pik(ik 6= ij): idij ,idik ,{Si}kijik .
The other participants can decrypt the message with the
session key kijik , then validate the shares from other nodes,
e.g. The share Sij can be verified by the other participants in
C by the equation zij
?
= g
Sij
ij
(mod pij ).
3) Similarly, Pij can receive the encrypted shares from the
other (t − 1) participants, after the decryption and validation
success, Pij can get the equation set established as below:
Sij ≡ S(mod mij ), (i = 1, 2, . . . , t)
According to the Chinese remainder theorem, the only solution
can be easily computed as
y =
t∑
k=1
SikM
′
C,ik
MC\{ik} (mod MC) (1)
So S = y(mod m0). the reconstruction can be accom-
plished and all secret S ∈ Zm0 can be reconstructed. The work
and schemes proposed before all assume that the exchange
of the encrypted shares are all correct and without malicious
forgery. But this can’t be ensured when the participants are
corrupted and act as a malicious attacker. But in the scheme
here, the authentication process ensures that the second cheat-
ing problem exists in this phase can be eliminated too.
In other parts of the paper, we will use a concision
form S CRT−−−→ {Si}i∈{1,...,n} to indicate secret S’s division
into n shares {Si}i∈{1,...,n} according to CRT-VSS scheme
with prime modulus parameters {mi}i∈{1,...,n}. Similarly,
S = CRTI({Sik})k∈{1,...,t} represents secret reconstructed
by coalition I = {ik}k∈{1,...,t}, |I| = t as Equation 1.
V. HOMOMORPHISM PROPERTY FOR CRT-VSS SCHEME,
BASIS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will explore the homomorphism prop-
erty of CRT-VSS scheme and do some preliminaries for the
trusted ECC-DSS distributed authentication scheme later. It’s
only mentioned in [4],[13] that the extended Asmuth-Bloom
scheme has homomorphic proprieties but without any proof
about it and such discussion about the homomorphic property
of CRT-VSS scheme is rare.
Lemma V.1. For any coalition I , |I| = t, the notation CRTI
donates the reconstruction scheme, then all CRT-VSS scheme
has (⊕,⊕) and (⊗,⊗)-homomorphism property, whenever
S1 = CRTI({S
1
ik
})k∈{1,...,t}, S2 = CRTI({S
2
ik
})k∈{1,...,t},
then
• (⊕,⊕). S1 ⊕ S2 = CRTI({S
1
ik
⊕ S2ik})k∈{1,...,t}.
• (⊗,⊗). S1 ⊕ S2 = CRTI({S
1
ik
⊗ S2ik})k∈{1,...,t}.
Proof: The proof is simple and easy similar to the proof
on Shamir’s scheme in [4] and we neglect it here.
Among the technical difficulties for designing distributed
authentication schemes, the secure shares-product sharing
scheme combing shares of two secrets, e.g. a and b, into shares
of the product of a · b, e.g. {aibi}i∈{1,...,n} is outstanding and
important. Though related work and discussion can be seen
in [3],[8], but they are all designed with Shamir’s polynomial
VSS scheme. Here we will first do some description about
them, then design the corresponding scheme for CRT-VSS
scheme.
Lemma V.2. The scheme combing shares of two secrets, e.g.
a, b ∈ Z , into shares of the product of a · b with Shamir’s
polynomial VSS scheme is as follows.
1) Setup work. With (t, n) Shamir’s VSS scheme, shares
{ai}i∈{1,...,n} and {bi}i∈{1,...,n} are generated by ran-
dom polynomial denoted as fa and fb with secret a and
b respectively.
e.g. a fa−→ {ai}i∈{1,...,n}, b
fb
−→ {bi}i∈{1,...,n},
2) Refreshing shares, {ci}i∈{1,...,n} are generated by
random polynomial fc with secret 0, e.g. 0
fc
−→
{ci}i∈{1,...,n}
3) After participant node Pi exchange vi = aibi + ci,
each Participant node Pi locally computes ab =
FI({vi})i∈{1,...,t}.
the scheme is (t−1) eavesdropping adversary tolerant secure
under the (t, n) threshold condition.
The details about the correctness and security analysis can
be seen in [3]. The scheme consists of two main steps,
degree reduction step ensure the correctness and randomization
step strengthen the security. Since 0 fc−→ {ci}i∈{1,...,n}, the
reconstruction is without retortion. Furthermore, in order to
maintain the (t − 1) eavesdropping adversary tolerant secure
property(against the decompose attack towards Shamir’s poly-
nomial), the additional permutation term ci is necessary to
keep the Shamir’s polynomial secret and irreducible. However,
the weakness of the Shamir’s scheme doesn’t exist in CRT
scheme and there is no need to keep such permutation term.
Thus we can design the corresponding scheme with better
concision and equal security.
Theorem V.1. The scheme combing shares of two secrets, e.g.
a and b, into shares of the product of a · b with CRT scheme
is (t− 1) eavesdropping adversary tolerant as follows.
1) Setup work. CRT scheme parameters {mi}i∈{1,...,n},
M =
∏
1≤i≤nmi, a, b ∈ ZM ,ab ∈ ZM . With CRT
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scheme,
e.g. a CRT−→ {ai}i∈{1,...,n}, b
CRT
−→ {bi}i∈{1,...,n},
2) After participant node Pi exchange vi = aibi(mod n),
each Participant node Pi locally computes ab =
CRTI{vi}i∈{1,...,t}.
the scheme is (t − 1) eavesdropping adversary tolerant
secure under the (t, n) threshold condition.
Proof: We will prove the correctness and security respec-
tively.
1) Correctness. According to Lemma V.1,
CRTI({vi})i∈{1,...,t} = CRTI({aibi})i∈{1,...,t}
= CRTI({ai})i∈{1,...,t} · CRTI({bi})i∈{1,...,t}
= a · b(mod M)
So the reconstruction of ab maintains well.
2) Security. On one hand, the reconstruction of ab is
(t − 1) tolerant, on the other hand, though the scheme
is designed without such refreshing permutation term
ci, while the weakness of decomposing for Shamir’s
scheme doesn’t exist in CRT scheme. So the adversary
can’t get more information like the decomposing attack
with Shamir’s scheme. Hence, the scheme is (t − 1)
eavesdropping adversary tolerant secure.
According to Theorem V.1, the secure shares-product shar-
ing scheme based on CRT scheme has better concision(without
the refreshing permutation term ci) compared with Shamir’s
scheme in Lemma V.2. From Lemma V.1 and Theorem V.1.
VI. A DISTRIBUTED ECC-DSS AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
BASED ON CRT-VSS AND TRUSTED COMPUTING
Among the schemes about the distributed authentication
protocol, the robust Digital Signature Standard(DSS) signature
scheme proposed in [8] is significant, it can achieve security
in different conditions. While the scheme is built on the
basis of Shamir’s scheme and the complexity of exponent
arithmetic is high. Besides, the biggest problem is that the
choice of the authentication nodes is random. The lack of
the validation of the secret shares in the node and the trusted
property may lead to DoS and fault attack security problem.
The distributed ECC-DSS authentication scheme based on
CRT-VSS and trusted computing proposed later will solve
those problems together. The whole protocol consists of three
phases, including trusted choice phase, signature generation
phase and signature verification phase.
A. trusted choice phase
Suppose the request node A apply for a signature for
distributed authentication with message M . Here we don’t
focus on a password-protected mechanism [2] with secret
sharing in some e-commercial scenarios(e.g., [10]) and don’t
contain it explicitly. The details are as follows.
1) Compute the digest of the message M with some Hash
function, e.g. m=SHA-1(M ).
2) A choose n trusted authentication nodes Pi(1 ≤ i ≤
n) to ask for distributed authentication. The process is
similar to that in distribution phase in CRT-VSS scheme
in section IV.
• A B→ {Pi}(Pi ∈ P): idD ,REQUEST.
• Pi → A: idi,idA,auth(idi, idA).
After the authentication process, request node A choose
t qualified nodes as a coalition C to finish the distributed
authentication later.
3) Request node A broadcast the digest m to the nodes in
coalition C as A B→ {Pi}(Pi ∈ C): idA,m.
B. DSS signature generation phase
This phase will do the generation work of the DSS sig-
nature. The scheme will be founded on the basis of Elliptic
curve and the DSS signature[8]. Here are some notations and
preliminaries before the phase. Suppose point G is one point
on the Elliptic curve Ep(a, b) ∈ Zn with the order q, f
is a big prime. The secret private key S has been divided
into Si’s and shared by node Pi respectively. On the Elliptic
curve, the public key denoted as Q = SG. Some necessary
constrains: 0 ≤ Si ≤ q, MC ≤ M ≤ n. The notation
λ
CRT
−→ {λi}i∈{1,...,n} represents that number λ can be divided
into shares {λi}i∈{1,...,n} with our CRT scheme proposed in
section III and notation λ = CRTI{λi}i∈{1,...,t} represents
the reconstruction of λ with t shares {λi}i∈{1,...,t}. The details
of the protocol are as follows.
1) Setup work. Choose random values k, a ∈ Zf , k CRT−→
{ki}i∈{1,...,n}, a
CRT
−→ {ai}i∈{1,...,n}.
2) Participant node Pi broadcast vi = kiai(mod n) and
wi = aiG(mod n). After collecting the vi’s and wi’s,
each Participant node Pi locally computes
• ka = CRTI{vi}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
• aG = CRTI{wi}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
• Compute r = k−1G = (ka)−1(aG)(mod f)
3) Each Participant Pi broadcasts sigi = ki(m+rSi). After
collecting, each Participant node Pi computes global
signature sig = CRTI{sigi}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
4) Output the (r, s) as the signature for m.
C. signature verification phase
1) Check the public parameters and limitations, do the
digest as m=SHA-1(M);
2) Do some preliminaries. w = s−1,u1 = mw(mod n),
u2 = rw(mod f);
3) Use the public key Q = SG(mod f) to do the verifica-
tion as X = u1G + u2Q. If X = O, then declare it as
a fault signature ,or else suppose X = (x, y), compute
v = x(mod f), if v = r holds, then accept the signature,
or else refuse.
Here we will do some simple analysis about the correctness
of the protocol and its security analysis will be done later in
section VIII separately. The proof of the correctness will have
two aspect on the s and r respectively.
1) Correctness of r. According to the protocol above,
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r = (ka)−1(aG)(mod f)
= (CRTI{vi})
−1
i∈{1,...,t} · CRTI{wi}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
= (CRTI{kiai})
−1
i∈{1,...,t} · CRTI{aiG}i∈{1,...,t}
= CRTI({kiai}i∈{1,...,t})
−1 · CRTI{aiG}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
≡ (ka)−1 · (aG)(mod f) ≡ k−1G(mod f).
2) Correctness of sig, combining the equation r = k−1G
which has been proved in (1) above,
sig = CRTI{sigi}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
= CRTI{ki(m+ rSi)}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
= CRTI{kim}i∈{1,...,t} +CRTI{kiSir}i∈{1,...,t}(mod f)
≡ km+ rCRTI{ki}i∈{1,...,t}CRTI{Si}i∈{1,...,t}
= km+ rkS(mod f)
= k(m+ Sr)(mod f).
It is the right shape of the DSS signature s.
VII. SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT SHARES REFRESHING
SCHEME
A. refreshing discussion on Shamir’s scheme
In the scheme proposed in [24] and other literature, the
traditional refreshing scheme of the shares use the (⊕,⊕)-
homomorphism property for Shamir’s scheme[21]. Each par-
ticipant nodes randomly generate refreshing shares and divide
them into subshares by randomly chosen t-degree random
Shamir’s polynomial with sharing of 0. After participants
finish exchanging the subshares, they refresh the shares with
subshares by addition operation. The literature before all de-
signs the share refreshing scheme with the Shamir’s threshold
scheme in [24],[22]. They all set the refreshing shares 0, then
generate the refreshing subshares. Here we will extend such
refreshing schemes based on (⊕,⊕)-homomorphism property
for Shamir’s scheme.
Theorem VII.1. The refreshing scheme based on (⊕,⊕)-
homomorphism property for Shamir’s scheme[21] is correct
as follows. For each participant Pi, Refreshing shares(RS)
constraints and subshares generation:{ ∑n
i=1 wi = 0 (a)
wi
fi
−→ {wij}j∈{1,...,n}
Refreshing operation:
S
′
j = Sj +
∑
1≤i≤n
wij (b)
Proof: The proof is easy and similar to [21], thus we
neglect it due to the space limitation here.
Obviously, the correctness of refreshing scheme above is
built on the assumption that all the participants are correct
and honest. As mentioned before that the lack of the trusted
assurance of the generation of the refreshing subshares will
result to the retortion problems of the secret S.
B. refreshing discussion on CRT-VSS scheme
Now we discuss the refreshing scheme on CRT-VSS
scheme, combining the (⊕,⊕) and (⊗,⊗) property in
Lemma V.1, we can easily get two trivial distributed refreshing
schemes in the similar way as Shamir’s scheme in Theo-
rem VII.1, which can furthermore deduce a general mixed
scheme. Here We skip the illustration of such two trivial
schemes and deliver the mixed scheme below.
Proposition VII.1. The (⊕,⊕) and (⊗,⊗)-mixed scheme
based on CRT-VSS scheme is correct as follows. RS constraints
and subshares generation:

∏k
i=1 wi ≡ 1,
∑n
i=k+1 wi ≡ 0 (mod M)
{wi}i∈{1,...,k} 6≡ 1 (mod M) (a)
{wi}i∈{k+1,...,n} 6= 0 (mod M) (b)
wi
CRT
−→ {wij}j∈{1,...,n}
Refreshing operation:
S
′
j = Sj ×
∏
1≤i≤k
wij +
n∑
i=k+1
wij (c)
We conduct modulus arithmatic operation,
S
′
j mod mi
= Sj ×
∏
1≤i≤k
wij +
∑
k+1≤i≤n
wij(mod mi)
≡ Sj × (
∏
1≤i≤k
wij mod mi) + (
∑
k+1≤i≤n
wij mod mi)
≡ Sj × 1 + 0 ≡ Sj
Obviously, the refreshing results has little function under the
modulus mi operation. So the three trivial refreshing schemes
aren’t correct refreshing schemes for CRT-VSS scheme.
Unluckily, besides the failure with trivial schemes above,
we can have the furthermore upsetting conclusion as follows.
Theorem VII.2. Without changing the prime parameters set
{mi}i∈{1,...,n}, the refreshing scheme without the retortion
problems can not avoid the refreshing failure under the
modulus mi operation, formally denoted as{
S = CRTI{Si}i∈{1,...,n} (a)
S = CRTI{S
′
i}i∈{1,...,n} (b)
⇒ Si ≡ S
′
i (mod mi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Proof: The proof can be finished in two different ways.
Here we just provide one due to the constraints of limitation.
According to the equation (a),(b), suppose the reconstruction
result before the modulus operation{
A =
∑t
k=1 SiM
′
C,iMC\{i}
A
′
=
∑t
k=1 S
′
iM
′
C,iMC\{i}
and {
S ≡ Si(mod mi)
S
′
≡ S
′
i(mod mi)
If the reconstruction without retortion holds, then
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TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN SHAMIR’S SCHEME AND CRT SCHEME
Comparison Items Shamir’s CRT
Computation complexity O(tlog2t) O(t)
Reconstruction parameter related No Yes.
Fit distributed refreshing Yes No.
Fit TTP refreshing No Yes
Homomorphism property (⊕,⊕) (⊕,⊕)
(⊗,⊗)
Secure shares-product concision Not good Good
A ≡ A
′
(mod MC)⇒ ∃k ∈ Z, A = kMC +A
′
hence, we can get
A(mod mi) = kMC + A
′
(mod mi)
≡ (kMC mod mi) + A
′
mod mi
≡ 0 + S
′
i(mod mi) ≡ S
′
i .
So such refreshing scheme results to little function by
modulus operation with {mi}i∈{1,...,n}.
According to the Theorem VII.2, a correct refreshing
scheme for CRT-VSS scheme need to change the prime
parameters set {mi}i∈{1,...,n}, the essence of the necessity is
the newly computation of a new share S′i modulus new mi’s.
And this will bring to some requirements as follows.
• The right computation of new share S′i modulus new
mi’s; The computation should be right and dependable,
this can be done by a Trusted Third Party(TTP).
• The right and secure delivery of the new shares; this
can be easily done by secure channel or by cryptography
mechanisms.
• The right update of the shares and remove of the old
ones. This can be assured by the normal process of the
protocol, so it can be ensured by the trusted computing
techniques.
C. comparisosn between Shamir’s and CRT scheme
From the analysis in Section VII-A and VII-B, we note
that there exist some differences between CRT and Shamir’s
schemes. Thus we summarize these comparison results in
Table I.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will prove the security of simple authenti-
cation framework between two nodes with CSP [11] model and
rank function [20] . Then extend the secure assurance to multi-
run and arbitrary size authentication case. After that we model
our CRT-VSS scheme, ECC-DSS authentication scheme based
on trusted computing and prove the security of the schemes.
The TPM can provide the authentication property towards
the remote party in a secure and private way. The security
of our protocol is built on the assumptions including: 1)TPM
can not be compromised by the intruder maintaining a right
property. By now, there is no successful way to compromise
the TPM without any damage of the right property of TPM.
Whatever happens, the TPM can record and reveal the property
of software/hardware within the node. 2) The security of
DAA and PBA protocol. It is mentioned in [5] and [6] that
the two protocol was secure under different assumptions.
Besides, the cryptographic primitives, including encryption
{·}k and signature Ssk(·) we employed are secure. We will
formally model the protocol and security property based on
communicating sequential processes(CSP)[11], and use the
rank function[20] to do some analysis and proof furthermore.
A. The preliminaries
1) The network: The network considered below will consist
of several different parties: Distributor denoted as D, Ap-
plicant for distributed authentication signature denoted as A,
Users acted as the participants with the secret shares denoted
as set USER and the intruder denoted as ENEMY . The
model of the network is standard, based on the Dolev-Yao
model. The ENEMY is in full control of the network, and
all communication passes through it. The attacker may choose
to block or redirect messages, send messages of its choice,
and imitate as other users. The capabilities of the attacker
are bounded by a finite set of deductions, by which it can
generate new messages from the set of messages it already
knows. Let “generates” relation X ⊢ m denotes that new
message m is deduced from a set X of messages. Here if
m,n are messages, k is a key and k−1 is the inverse of k,
then the smallest ⊢ relation satisfies. {m,n} ⊢ m.n/m/n,
{m, k} ⊢ {m}k/Sk(m), {{m}k, k
−1} ⊢ m, etc.
2) Authentication: Authentication can be captured in terms
of events whose occurrence guarantees the prior occurrence
of other messages. The key property is concerned with
precedence between events. Conditions can be expressed
as trace specifications on NET , requiring that no event
from a set T has occurred unless another event from a
set R has previously occurred, which can be illustrated as:
NET sat R precedes T . The rank function approach pro-
posed in [20] assigns a rank 0 to the messages that should
remain secret during the protocol and a rank 1 to the messages
that should be public and might be get held by the enemy. The
central rank theorem from [20] gives four conditions the rank
function must satisfy in order to maintain the rank with the
rank function.
B. Security analysis for simple authentication framework be-
tween two nodes
1) Simplification for protocol: The protocol framework
illustrated in Figure 1 can be simplified as Figure 2.
1. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,INIT
2. Pj → Pi: idj ,idi,n1
3. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,im,DSi,PSi,K INFO I
4. Pj → Pi: idj , idi,SpkAIKJ (K INFO J||idj ),{idj||n2}kij
5. Pi → Pj : idi,idj ,{idi||n2}kij
Fig. 2. Pi request authentication to node Pj
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2) Protocol modeling: single run and node I as the initiator
and node J as the responder.
Node I can be modeled as follows.
USER(I) = j∈P trans.i.j.idi.idj .INIT
→ recv.i.j.idj .idi.n1
→ trans.i.j.idi, idj .im,DSi, PSi,K INFO I
→ recv.i.j.idj , idi, SpkAIKJ (K INFO J ||idj), {idj ||n2}kij
→ trans.i.j.idi, idj , {idi||n2}kij → STOP.
Node J can be modeled in a similar way. as follows.
USER(J) = recv.j.i.idi, idj , INIT
→ trans.j.i.idj , idi, n1
→ recv.j.i.idi, idj , im,DSi, PSi,K INFO I
→ validate&Signal.T rust.i.n1.n2.
→ trans.j.i.idj , idi, SpkAIKJ (K INFO J ||idj), {idj ||n2}kij
→ recv.j.i.idi, idj , {idi||n2}kij → STOP.
The following process ENEMY characterize the behavior
of the attacker in possession of a set X of messages.
ENEMY (X) = trans.i.j.m → ENEMY (X ∪ {m})
 recv.i.j.m → ENEMY (X).
The entire network is thus modeled by process NET , a
parallel composition of USER(I), USER(J) and ENEMY
. The process is synchronized on trans and rec:
NET = (USER(I)|||USER(J)) ‖
{trans,recv}
ENEMY
The objective of the protocol can be expressed as R =
{trans.i.j.idi, idj , im,DSi, PSi,K INFO I} precedes T =
{signal.T rust.i.n}.
The rank function for the authentication framework between
the two nodes are as in Figure 3.
User and host: ρ(idi) = 1,ρ(INIT ) = 1
Nonces:ρ(n1) = 1,ρ(n2) = 0
Integrity metrics: ρ(im) = 1
TPM signatures: ρ(DSi) = 0,ρ(PSi) = 0
K INFO: ρ(g) = 1,ρ(gx) = 0,ρ(gy) = 0
Encryption: ρ({m}kij = ρ(kij))
AIK Signature: ρ(SpkAIKJ (K INFO J||idj)) = 0
Concatenations:ρ(m1,m2) = min{ρ(m1), ρ(m2)}
Events: ρ(trans.i.j.m) = ρ(rec.i.j.m) = ρ(m)
Signals: ρ(Signal.T rust.i.n1.n2) = 0
Fig. 3. Rank function for the authentication between node Pi and Pj
Checking the four conditions above is easy and just routine.
We neglect the details due to the limitation of paper. With the
rank function in the figure above, we can see that:
• The messages in the initial set X known to the ENEMY
process are of rank 1.
• Any message generated by ENEMY from X under the
deductions rules has a rank pub whenever messages in
X have a rank 1.
• ρ(Signal.T rust.i.n1.n2) in R has a rank 0.
• When R = {trans.i.j.idi, idj , im,DSi, PSi,K INFO I}
is blocked, user can never give out a message of rank 0
unless it has previously received one.
So according to the central theorem of rank function, the rank
function above can maintain the rank well. Furthermore, the
authentication property of the simple authentication framework
can be proved secure well.
C. Security analysis for multi-run and arbitrary size authen-
tication framework
In this subsection we show that if there is an attack up on
the authentication framework of arbitrary size with multi-run
given in the subsection before, then there is an attack up on
the small framework described above with a single initiator
A and a single responder B. Similar work with the classical
Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol can be seen in [16].
The process of proof can be carried out by two aspects from
the attacks upon responder and initiator respectively.
1) Attacks upon the responder: Consider a run α where the
intruder imitates the initiator A to attack the responder B as
in Figure 4.
Message α.1. I(A) → B: A,B,INIT
Message α.2. B → I(A): B,A,n1
Message α.3. I(A) → B: A,B,imA,DSA,PSA,g,gx
Message α.4. B → I(A): B,A,gy ,{B||n2}kAB
Message α.5. I(A) → B: A,B,{A||n2}kAB
Fig. 4. Intruder imitates initiator A to attack responder B
In order to attack upon the responder B successfully, the
intruder needs to produce message 1,3 and 5. Message 1 can be
produced easily. As to the message 3, the intruder can produce
it by replay the signature DSA and PSA by eavesdropping
the message with the signatures inside. While the get of the
message 5 can be rather difficult since the session key kAB
only established between the real A and B party. So the
intruder cannot decrypt the message α.4, so he learns neither
n2 nor {A||n2}kAB from message α.4, denoted as:¬(Intruder
learns n2 ∨ {A||n2}kAB from α.4).
According to the analysis delivered in [16], the way to solve
this problem for intruder is to replay the encrypted part of
message α.4 in message 4 in another run called β, and learns
the n2 or {A||n2}kAB from message β.5. Note that the initiator
of run β must be A. Hence the form of the run β should be
as follows in Figure 5: Now we see that the intruder learns
Message β.1. A → I(B): A,B,INIT
Message β.2. I(B) → A: B,A,n1
Message β.3. A → I(B): A,B,imA,DSA,PSA,g,gx
Message β.4. I(B) → A: B,A,gy,{B||n2}kAB
Message β.5. A → I(B): A,B,{A||n2}kAB
Fig. 5. The form of auxiliary run β
the component imA,DSA,PSA,g,gx from Message β.3. and
replays this in α.3, learns the component {A||n2}kAB from
Message β.5. and replays this in α.5. So only these two runs
are necessary for the intruder to learn all the knowledge it
uses in the attack upon the responder. Thus if the intruder can
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imitate the initiator A to attack the responder B then such an
attack would have been found by considering the small system
above.
2) Attacks upon the initiator: Similar analysis can be done
and we neglect it here.
Combining these two aspects, we can get the conclusion
that our scheme with multi-run and arbitrary size can also be
secure under authentication property.
D. Security analysis for the complete protocols in this paper
1) Distributing phase for CRT-VSS scheme: The model of
process T characterize trusted election before the distributing
process, D dealing with the distributing procedure. Process
USER represents the behavior of node during the first phase
in the CRT-VSS scheme.
TI(i) = trans.D.i.idD, AUTH,SskAIKD (idD)
→ recv.D.i.idi, auth(idi, idD)
→ validate&signal.T rust..
→ STOP
TR(i) = recv.D.i.idi, idD, AUTH
→ trans.D.i.idD, idi, auth(idD, idi)
→ recv.D.i.idi, idD, AGREE
→ STOP.
D(i) = i∈Ctrans.D.i.idD , idi, SskAIKD (idD), enckiD (Si)
→ STOP
i∈P trans.D.i.idD , idi, SskAIKD (idD ||pi||gi||mi)
, PUBLIC
→ STOP.
USERR(i) = recv.i.D.idD , idi, AUTH,SskAIKD (idD)
→ validate(SskAIKD (idD))
→ trans.i.D.idi, idD, auth(idi, idD)
→ STOP
USERI(i) = trans.i.D.idi, idD, AUTH
→ recv.i.D.idD , idi, auth(idD, idi)
→ validate(auth(idD, idi))&signal.T rust...
→ trans.i.D.idi, idD, AGREE
→ STOP.
The process TR(i) and USERI(i) are similar to TI(i) and
USERR(i). The entire network is thus modeled as follows.
D = |||i∈C(D(i)),
T (i) = ((TI(i)|||TR(i))), T = |||i∈P(T (i)),
USER(i) = ((USERI(i)|||USERR(i))),
USER = |||i∈CUSER(i),
DIS = (USER|||T ) → D,
NET = (DIS) ‖
{trans,recv}
ENEMY
The objective of the distribution phase scheme is R =
{trans.i.D.idi, auth(idi, idD)∧ trans.D.i.idD, auth(idD, idi)}
precedes T = {trans/recv.i.D.idi, AGREE}.
2) Reconstruction phase for CRT-VSS scheme: In this
phase, the participant exchange the secret shares with each
other. Each node send and receive and shares at the same
time as initiator and responder respectively.
USER
I
R(J) = J∈Crecv.i.j.idj , idi, AUTH
→ trans.i.j.idi, idj , auth(idi, idj)
→ recv.i.j.idj , idi, {Sj}kij
→ STOP
USER
I
I(J) = I∈Ctrans.i.j.idi, idj , AUTH
→ recv.i.j.idj , idi, auth(idj , idi)
→ validate(auth(idj , idi))&signal.T rust...
→ trans.i.j.idi, idj , {Si}kij
→ STOP.
The entire network for the reconstruction scheme is thus
modeled as follows.
USER
I = J∈C(|||USER
I
I (J))|||(|||USER
I
R(J)),
USER = |||I∈C(USER
I),
NET = USER ‖
{trans,recv}
ENEMY
Similarly, the objective of the reconstruction scheme is
as follows: R = {trans.j.i.auth(idi, idj)} precedes T =
{trans.i.j.{Si}kij}. Here we neglect the model details like
above due to the limitation of paper.
3) Distributed ECC-DSS authentication scheme based on
trusted computing: In the scheme, the node A will request for
the authentication and signature from the participant nodes.
Each node will send and receive shares at the same time
as initiator and responder respectively. The model can be
described as follows.
REQA(I) = i∈P trans.A.i.idA, idi, REQU
→ recv.A.i.idi, idA, AGREE
→ trans.A.i.idA, idi, AUTH
→ recv.A.i.idi, idA, auth(idi, idA)
→ validate&signal.T rust....
→ trans.A.i.m
→ STOP.
USER
I
REC = recv.i.A.idA, idi, REQU
→ trans.i.A.idi, idA, AGREE
→ recv.i.A.idA, idi, AUTH
→ trans.i.A.idi, idA, auth(idi, idA)
→ recv.i.A.m
→ STOP.
USER
I
I (J) = J∈Ctrans.i.j.idi, idj , kiai
 trans.i.j.idi, idj , aiG
→ STOP.
USER
I
R(J) = J∈Crecv.i.i.idj , idi, kjaj
 trans.i.j.idj , idi, ajG
→ trans.i.A.sig
→ STOP.
The process USERIREC and USERIR(J) are similar to
REQA(I) and USERII(J). So the entire network is thus
modeled as follows.
USER
I = J∈C(|||USER
I
I (J))|||(|||USER
I
R(J)),
USER = |||I∈CUSER
I
, USERREC = |||I∈C (USER
I
REC),
REQA = |||I∈CREQA(I).
NET = ((REQA|||USERREC)|||USER) ‖ ENEMY
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The objective of the scheme is : R =
{trans.i.A.idi, idA, auth(idi, idA)} precedes T =
{trans.A.i.m}.
4) Overall analysis : From the CSP model illustrated
above about the schemes above, we can see that: that the
authentication objective essentially can be reduced to the
authentication objective within the authentication framework
between the single initiator and responder. (i) All the au-
thentication objectives in the schemes has the essence that
R precedes T , here R can be summarized as the multi-
run execution of the authentication framework auth(·). In
detail, in the reconstruction phase and distributed ECC-DSS
scheme R = {trans.U.U, auth(·)} represents the maintain
unidirectional authentication property. While the bi-directional
authentication property holds in distribution phase R . And the
T represents the corresponding service and action in different
schemes. (ii) The security of multi-run execution of the
authentication framework can be reduced to the single small
authentication framework. The detailed proof can be seen in
section VIII-C. Take distribution phase scheme as example,
the multi-run with arbitrary size authentication component,
i.e USER(i),USER, T , can be reduced to simple small
framework instance. The USER component appears in the
complete model of reconstruction and ECC-DSS model.
According to analysis from two aspects above, we can
conclude that the security proof towards the authentication
property for the small authentication framework can hold the
authentication property of complicate multi-run and arbitrary
case. So the authentication property of schemes can be main-
tained well above.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secret key distributed storage
scheme based on CRT-VSS and trusted computing, solving
the two category cheating problems in the VSS area before.
Then we explore and do overall analysis of the (⊕,⊕),(⊗,⊗)
homomorphic property with the CRT-VSS scheme and design
the corresponding secure shares-product sharing scheme base
on CRT scheme. At last, on the foundation of the robust
DSS scheme, our proposed ECC-DSS distributed authenti-
cation scheme based on trusted computing eliminates the
possibility of the malicious attack, e.g. DoS attack and fault
attack, during the process of signature generation. The security
analysis proves that our schemes can maintain relative security
assurance under certain conditions.
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